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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE VOLUNTARY ACT REQUIREMENT IN PRISON
CONTRABAND CASES

INTRODUCTION
When has one committed the crime of introducing prison contraband? This
is an important question when one is visiting a prison, voluntarily or otherwise,
and a question which can be surprisingly difficult to answer. Most state statutes
punishing the introduction of prison contraband look much like California’s
statute:
Except when otherwise authorized by law . . . any person, who knowingly brings
or sends into, or knowingly assists in bringing into, or sending into, any state
prison . . . or within the grounds belonging to the institution, any controlled
substance, . . . any device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia intended to
be used for unlawfully injecting or consuming a controlled substance, is guilty
of a felony . . . . 1

These statutes are straightforward, containing a mens rea, usually “knowingly,” 2
an actus reus, usually introducing, possessing, conveying, etc., 3 and then a list
of prohibited objects. Moreover, the prototypical prison-contraband cases, such
as baking a gun into a cake and mailing it to prison, 4 or mailing a friend drugs
in a package designated as legal mail, 5 are equally straightforward violations of
introducing-contraband statutes. However, in a subset of prison-contraband
cases, where the defendant is arrested with the contraband already on his or her
person, loaded into the back of a police car, and taken to the county jail, the
violation is not so clear. These cases are complicated by the defendants’ simple
defense that they did not want to bring their contraband to jail; rather, their arrest
“forced” them to bring it into the facility.
Usually, these cases play out like the case of People v. Gastello, where the
defendant was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance

1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4573(a) (2011).
2. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505(A)(1) (2016); PENAL § 4573(a); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-8-203(1)(a) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.36(A) (2013).
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2505(A)(2) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-203(1)(a)
(2012); MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.36(A) (2013).
4. Jesse Rhodes, The File Inside the Cake: True Tales of Prison Escapes, SMITHSONIAN.COM
(June 14, 2011), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-file-inside-the-cake-true-talesof-prison-escapes-15653967/ [https://perma.cc/WTR3-BLH2].
5. Wilson v. Haney, 430 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014).
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and placed in the back of a police car. 6 The arresting officer informed the
defendant that possessing controlled substances at the jail was a felony. 7 The
defendant manifested understanding but did not declare possession of any
forbidden items. 8 Once at the jail, officers conducted an intake search and
discovered .32 grams of methamphetamine in the defendant’s sweatshirt. 9
Gastello was charged and found guilty of bringing a controlled substance into
prison. 10
Gastello was decided in California, one of the majority of States that punish
suspects arrested while in possession of contraband and taken to prison with
specific, prison-contraband statutes. 11 But in a handful of States, when faced
with nearly identical facts, the courts will find the defendant innocent. 12 This
discrepancy stems from courts’ varying interpretations of their voluntary act
requirements. 13 While some courts find that defendants like Gastello commit a
voluntary act somewhere within their possession, arrest, and journey to jail,
others do not. Bizarrely enough though, the voluntary act requirements in these
jurisdictions are also remarkably similar. So here is the problem, various courts
facing effectively identical facts and with practically identical voluntary act
requirements reach conflicting results in introducing-prison-contraband cases.14
Part I of this paper seeks to illustrate the problem by analyzing two
conflicting introducing-prison-contraband cases in the context of each State’s
voluntary act requirement. Part II asks the practical question of “how?”: how
can two courts with identical facts and identical laws come to two opposing

6. 232 P.3d 650, 652 (Cal. 2010).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 653.
11. Including California, ten States have found a defendant in this situation guilty of
introducing prison contraband. North Carolina: State v. Barnes, 747 S.E.2d 912, 922 (N.C. Ct. App.
2013); Arizona: State v. Taylor, Nos. 1 CA-CR09-0626, 1 CA-CR09-0666, 2010 WL 3597222, at
¶ 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2010); Kentucky: Taylor v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 563, 566
(Ky. 2010); Virginia: Herron v. Commonwealth, 688 S.E.2d 901, 907–08 (Va. Ct. App. 2010);
Missouri: State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Ohio: State v. Cargile, 916
N.E.2d 775, 778 (Ohio 2009); Tennessee: State v. Carr, No. M2007–01759–CCA–R3–CD, 2008
WL 4368240, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2009); Texas: Brown v. State, 89 S.W.3d 630, 633
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002); and Iowa: State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Iowa 1999).
12. Those states in the minority include: Washington: State v. Eaton, 177 P.3d 157, 162
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008); New Mexico: State v. Cole, 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007);
and Oregon: State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 459–60 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
13. All states, whether by statute or by common law, require that criminal conduct include a
voluntary act. The comments to the Model Penal Code list 27 states that have statutory voluntary
act requirements and 11 States with common law requirements. Presumably the remaining 12 States
fall into one of the two categories or some mixture thereof. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 n.14 (AM.
LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
14. See cases cited supra notes 11 and 12.
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results? I argue that the courts employ two tools, time-framing and
disjoining/unifying acts to reach “subjective” rather than “objective” concepts
of voluntariness. Part III asks the “why?” question: why do courts manipulate a
given arrestee’s conduct to reach their understanding of voluntariness? I argue
that in addition to the language of the statutes, “includes a voluntary act,” courts
are guided by personal means. Acknowledging that courts, at least in part, are
deciding introducing-prison-contraband cases on personal grounds, Part IV
offers model statutes to standardize our approach to culpability. And finally, Part
V concludes with some parting thoughts on the voluntary act requirement as a
whole.
I. THE TWO APPROACHES TO INTRODUCING-PRISON-CONTRABAND CASES
It will help to establish a quick understanding of the voluntary act
requirement before directly comparing two introducing-prison-contraband
cases. A fundamental tenet of criminal law is that “[a] person is not guilty of an
offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act
or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.” 15 The
Model Penal Code (“MPC”) adopts a strict construal of the language “includes
a voluntary act.” An explanatory note following section 2.01 of the MPC states
that, “[i]t is, however, required only that the actor’s conduct include a voluntary
act, and thus unconsciousness preceded by voluntary action may lead to liability
based upon the earlier conduct.” This reading of the MPC’s voluntary act
requirement has been called “the single voluntary act” view. 16 Many States have
adopted this “single voluntary act” requirement, leading to results like the
conviction in State v. White, where the defendant was “playing soldier” with a
shotgun when it accidentally discharged, shooting a fourteen-year-old girl. 17 The
court held that although shooting the gun was not voluntary, “playing soldier”
was voluntary. Therefore, because the “State need not prove the voluntariness
of each and every act,” only that the conduct “includes a voluntary act,” the
requirement was satisfied. 18
However, despite nearly unanimous use of the language “includes a
voluntary act,” the single voluntary act view has not achieved unanimous
application. A poignant portrayal of this fact comes in our introducing-prisoncontraband cases. So, armed with an understanding of the voluntary act
requirement and the single voluntary act view, we turn to a comparison of two
introducing-prison-contraband cases.

15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (emphasis
added).
16. Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1545,
1565–66 (2013).
17. 138 S.W.3d 783, 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
18. Id. at 785–86.
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The first case is State v. Winsor. 19 On December 3, 2001, Ian Winsor was
pulled over for driving the wrong direction down a one-way street. 20 The acting
officer, Sergeant K.J. Heather, collected Winsor’s information and ran it through
a computerized database of law enforcement information. 21 The search revealed
two outstanding warrants for possession of a controlled substance and a
probation violation. 22 Accordingly, Officer Heather arrested Winsor and placed
him in the back of the police car. 23 Officer Heather informed Winsor that he was
being taken to the county jail and that, if he had any other drugs on him, he
should turn them over now because possessing drugs at the jail would constitute
a felony. 24 Winsor remained silent. 25 As part of the admission process of the
county jail, Winsor was searched and found to have a baggie of marijuana in his
shorts. 26 Instead of charging Winsor with possession of marijuana, the State
charged Winsor with possession of a controlled substance on the premises of a
county jail under section 221.111 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 27 After a
trial, Winsor was found guilty. 28 Winsor appealed on the grounds that his action
was involuntary but the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District affirmed. 29
The second case is State v. Tippetts. 30 Farrell Tippetts was arrested in his
home and brought to the Washington County Jail. 31 Before he was admitted,
Officer Morey asked Tippetts if he had any drugs or weapons that he would be
bringing into the jail. 32 Tippetts did not declare any such items. 33 Officer Morey
then searched Tippetts and discovered a baggie of marijuana. 34 Tippetts was
charged under Oregon’s statute against supplying contraband to correctional
facilities. 35 Tippetts was found guilty after a trial. 36 Tippetts also appealed, but
unlike Winsor, Tippetts was found to be innocent because he had not voluntarily
supplied contraband. 37

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

110 S.W.3d 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 885, 888.
43 P.3d 455 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 456.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 456.
Id.
Id. at 459–60.
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Both Winsor and Tippetts begin their analyses by laying out the State’s
voluntary act statute. In Winsor, the voluntary act statute is section 562.011 of
the Missouri Revised Statues:
1. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his or her liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act.
2. A “voluntary act” is:
(1) A bodily movement performed while conscious as a result of effort or
determination; or
(2) An omission to perform an act of which the actor is physically capable.
3. Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procures or receives
the thing possessed, or having acquired control of it was aware of his or her
control for a sufficient time to have enabled him or her to dispose of it or
terminate his or her control. 38

In Tippetts, the voluntary act statute is section 161.095(1) of the Oregon
Revised Statues, which states: “The minimal requirement for criminal liability
is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the
omission to perform an act which the person is capable of performing.” 39 Oregon
explicitly defines some of these terms in section 161.085 of the Oregon Revised
Statues:
(1) “Act” means a bodily movement.
(2) “Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously and
includes the conscious possession or control of property.
(3) “Omission” means a failure to perform an act the performance of which is
required by law.
(4) “Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.
(5) “To act” means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

In comparing the statutes, we can see that both Missouri and Oregon require
that criminal conduct “includes” a voluntary act, that an “act” is a bodily
movement performed consciously, and that possession is a voluntary act. 40
38. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 885–86. Interestingly, there is another possession statute, MO. REV.
STAT. § 195.010(34) (2017), which defines possession specifically for controlled substances. The
Winsor court never mentions this statute. It is unclear why the court in Winsor did not also make
use of this statute since the prison contraband statute, MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017), expressly
prohibits possessing “any controlled substance.” It is possible the court avoided this statute because
it is used for possession charges under MO. REV. STAT. § 579.015 (2017), and the court wished to
distinguish MO. REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017). Or, it is possible the court simply believed using
both possession statutes would be redundant.
39. Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 456.
40. There is one slight discrepancy between the statutes in the definition of possession.
Missouri’s statute defines possession as “knowingly procur[ing]” the item or being “aware of his
or her control for a sufficient time” to have disposed of it. Oregon on the other hand defines
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The courts then apply the voluntary act statute to their prison contraband
statutes. In Missouri, the relevant statute is section 221.111.1 of the Missouri
Revised Statues, which states, in pertinent part:
1. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or
jail if such person knowingly delivers, attempts to deliver, possesses, deposits,
or conceals in or about the premises of any correctional center as the term
“correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any city, county, or
private jail:
(1) Any controlled substance as that term is defined by law, except upon the
written prescription of a licensed physician, dentist, or veterinarian;

Oregon’s relevant statute is section 162.185(1)(a) of the Oregon Revised
Statutes, which states, in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the crime of supplying contraband if:
(a) The person knowingly introduces any contraband into a correctional facility,
youth correction facility or state hospital;

In comparison, we can see that Missouri’s prison contraband statute
punishes knowingly delivering, attempting to deliver, possessing, depositing, or
concealing contraband in or about a correctional facility, and Oregon’s statute
punishes knowingly introducing contraband into a correctional facility. While
an argument could be made that the preposition “into” contained in Oregon’s
statute is distinguishable from Missouri’s use of “in or about,” the common
sense reading of these two statutes would indicate that both punish identical
actions.
Despite the similarities in statutes, the two courts differ drastically in the
next step of their analysis. In Winsor, defendant’s main argument is that he was
not “voluntarily” in or about the premises of a correctional facility and
accordingly did not meet an essential element of the crime. 41 The court rejects
the idea that voluntary presence at the correctional facility was required. 42
Instead, the court focuses on the voluntary possession preceding Winsor’s
presence at the county jail:

possession as “conscious possession or control of property.” The difference is likely only one of
language and not substance as conscious possession roughly encompasses both knowingly
procuring and awareness for a sufficient period of time to enable disposal.
41. Winsor’s brief and subsequently the court’s decision is broken into three arguments: (1)
“[T]hat the voluntary presence on the county jail premises of the person charged is a crucial element
of the crime for which he stands convicted,” (2) “that his voluntary presence on the county jail’s
premises was required,” and (3) “that his possession of a controlled substance on county jail
premises was not a voluntary act because he was transported to the county jail against his will.”
Winsor, 110 S.W.3d at 886–87. In reality, these three arguments are one argument: because Winsor
was not voluntarily present at the county jail, he did not satisfy the voluntary act requirement.
42. Id. at 886.
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Appellant was convicted for his voluntary conduct of possessing a controlled
substance in or about the county jail. Appellant’s willful possession of a
controlled substance itself constitutes the requisite voluntary act. His secreting
the substance in or about the county jail, regardless of whether he was present
voluntarily, satisfies evidentiary requirements to support the conviction. 43

The court is very clear on its implementation of the “single voluntary act”
view, recognizing that Winsor’s presence may have been involuntary, but
nonetheless finding the requisite voluntary act in his prior possession. The court
later does a quick analysis of Winsor’s possession:
The arresting officer asked [Winsor] if he had any other controlled substances
on his person and informed him that bringing a controlled substance onto the
premises of the county jail constituted a felony. Once he was apprised of this
fact, [Winsor] had sufficient time to dispose of or terminate his control over the
controlled substance. 44

The court found that Winsor voluntarily possessed the marijuana under
Missouri Revised Statute 562.011(3), which requires he “was aware of his . . .
control for a sufficient time to have enabled him . . . to dispose of it,” and
therefore, his voluntary possession was the requisite single voluntary act. 45
In its argument in Tippetts, the State offers the same rationale employed by
the court in Winsor to support a conviction. The court wrote, “[t]he state argues
alternatively that, even if defendant did not voluntarily introduce the marijuana
into the jail, he voluntarily possessed it before his arrest and that act is sufficient
to satisfy O.R.S. 161.095(1).” 46 Yet, where this rationale was sufficient in
Winsor, the court rejects it in Tippetts, choosing instead to focus on the act of
“introducing” the contraband and ignoring the prior act of possession. 47 The
court stated: “Defendant, however, did not initiate the introduction of the
contraband into the jail or cause it to be introduced in the jail. Rather, the
contraband was introduced into the jail only because the police took defendant
(and the contraband) there against his will.” 48 This fact is no less true in Winsor
than it is in Tippetts. In both instances, the police took the defendant to the
county jail against his will. And in both instances the defendant has delivered,
possessed, or introduced contraband into the correctional facility, in as much as
he brought his marijuana from outside the doors to inside the doors.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 888.
Id. at 887.
State v. Tippets, 43 P.3d 455, 457 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 459.
Id. at 457.
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II. HOW THE TWO COURTS REACH OPPOSING CONCLUSIONS
How then, was Ian Winsor convicted and Farrell Tippetts released? The
answer lies in two judicial tools Mark Kelman calls “time-framing” and
“unifying/disjoining” acts. 49 Time-framing refers to establishing “the temporal
boundaries of the criminal conduct: when that conduct can be said to begin and
end.” 50 Disjoining acts is the method of determining which acts, within a
continuum of acts, can be said to “contribute” to or result in the criminalized
conduct. Kelman states that unifying/disjoining occurs when:
[W]e feel we must look beyond a single moment in time and account, in some
fashion, for some clearly relevant earlier moment. The earlier “moment” may be
the time at which a defendant made some judgment about the situation she was
in, some judgment that at least contributed to the ultimate decision to act
criminally. 51

Armed with these two tools, courts can manipulate a variety of acts to either find
or not find a requisite voluntary act.
Like many theories, these two tools are easier to understand in application.
For clarity’s sake, I’ll apply time-framing and disjoining/unifying acts to a wellcited voluntariness case, Martin v. State, 52 before applying it to the introducingprison-contraband cases. In Martin, officers arrested the defendant, who was
drunk in his home, and brought him outside, onto the highway, where he was in
violation of public intoxication. 53 In setting the time-frame for Martin, one could
say the criminalized conduct begins when the defendant started drinking and
ends when he is present on the public highway. This time-frame includes a
certain spectrum of acts. Within this spectrum, the court can engage in
disjoining/unifying the acts to select which acts contribute to public intoxication.
If the court finds that the acts of drinking and being present in public are
disjoined acts, that is, two distinct moments each contributing to the charged
crime, the court can find that the voluntary act of drinking satisfies the voluntary
act requirement. Alternatively, the court could limit the time-frame, claiming the
conduct begins when the defendant is arrested and ends when he is drunk in
public, which would exclude the voluntary act of drinking. Or, the court could
keep a time-frame which includes the voluntary act of drinking, but not disjoin
the acts of drinking and being present in public, in which case the unified act of
public intoxication would be involuntary. Regardless of which route the court

49. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 593–95 (1981).
50. Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability,
and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 84, 91 (1990).
51. Kelman, supra note 49, at 595.
52. 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944).
53. Id. at 427.
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takes, these tools will help the court justify the inclusion or exclusion of a
voluntary act. 54
Applying time-framing and disjoining/unifying actions to the introducingprison-contraband context, we begin to see the process by which these two
courts reach opposing conclusions. In Winsor, the court explicitly disjoins the
actions of possession and presence, when it states, “[t]o accept [Winsor]’s
position that his voluntary act of possessing a controlled substance is somehow
negated by the fact that he was involuntarily on the county jail’s premises would
render section 221.111.1(1) meaningless.” 55 By disjoining the actions, the court
allows itself to create a time-frame that could either include or exclude Winsor’s
voluntary act, possession. The court chooses to set boundaries that include the
voluntary act, and convict Winsor on the grounds that his prior possession
satisfies the voluntary act requirement.
In Tippetts, the court similarly disjoins the actions but imposes a more
limited time-frame that excludes the prior act of possession. The court neatly
lays out the two approaches of disjoined or unified acts, by recording the parties’
arguments:
The state reasons that, even if defendant did not voluntarily introduce the
marijuana into the jail after the police arrested him, he voluntarily possessed it
before he was arrested. The earlier voluntary act of possession, the state
concludes, is sufficient to hold defendant criminally liable for the later
involuntary act of introducing the marijuana into the jail. Defendant responds
that ORS 162.185(1)(a) punishes the act of introducing the contraband into a
correctional facility; it does not punish the act of possessing drugs. 56

The court accepts parts of both parties’ arguments. Regarding the State’s
argument, the court acknowledges that Tippetts voluntarily possessed the drugs
and that his possession served in some fashion as a predicate to the later
introduction of the drugs into a correctional facility. 57 However, it is the
weakness of that predicate which persuades the court to adopt a narrow timeframe and exclude the act of possession: “the involuntary act must, at a
minimum, be a reasonably foreseeable or likely consequence of the voluntary
act on which the state seeks to base criminal liability.” 58 Because introducing
marijuana into a correctional facility is not a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of possessing marijuana, the court chooses to ignore the act for the
54. To be fair, Kelman labels these “tools” unconscious interpretive constructs. It might be an
overstatement to claim that judges are actively using time-framing and disjoining/unifying to
cherry-pick results. Rather, as Kelman puts it, unconscious constructs “are often used to avoid
issues inherent in [conscious constructs], issues that the legal analysts are most prone to be aware
are controversial, perhaps insoluble, and highly politicized.” Kelman, supra note 49, at 593.
55. State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
56. State v. Tippets, 3 P.3d 455, 459 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
57. Id. at 459–60.
58. Id.
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purpose of satisfying the voluntary act requirement. Thus, despite having a
voluntary act statute requiring conduct that only “includes a voluntary act,” the
court did not find the voluntary act of possession satisfied the statute.
As perhaps has already been shown, the process of time-framing and
disjoining/unifying actions can be arbitrary, and it can be abused. Regarding
time-framing, Larry Alexander notes that, “if we time-frame too broadly we
make the voluntary act principle vacuous.” 59 And as far back as Aristotle, people
have suggested that acts dating from childhood can in some sense be said to
contribute to the crimes of adulthood, even involuntary crimes. 60 If time-framing
and disjoining/unifying acts are the tools allowing courts to determine whether
a crime is voluntary, the remaining question is why do some courts seek a
voluntary act where others do not.
III. WHY THE TWO COURTS REACH OPPOSING CONCLUSIONS
That the courts in Missouri and Oregon reached different conclusions and
how they did exhibits the arbitrary process of selecting a voluntary act, but it
does little to reveal the guidelines the two courts followed in making their
determination. The basic issue is why one court was willing to accept the
voluntary act of possession but not the other court. I argue that the reason some
States have convicted defendants in Winsor’s situation while other States have
not rests on notions of culpability.
The necessity of a voluntary act requirement is so apparent that it can be
difficult to say exactly why it must exist, but most scholars agree that criminal
conduct must include a voluntary act to ensure that punishment is appropriate
for the actor. That is, a voluntary act is necessary to evaluate culpability. 61

59. Alexander, supra note 50, at 91.
60. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1113b–1114a (H. Rackham trans., 1934).
Well, but men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living
carelessly, as they are for being unjust or profligate if they do wrong or pass their time in
drinking and dissipation. They acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a
particular way. This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for some contest
or pursuit: they practice continually. Therefore, only an utterly senseless person can fail to
know that our characters are the result of our conduct; but if a man knowingly acts in a way
that will result in his becoming unjust, he must be said to be voluntarily unjust.
Aristotle uses this rationale to justify punishing the drunken criminal who, although he committed
the crime involuntarily, was drunk by voluntary habit.
61. A.P. Simester, On the So-Called Requirement for Voluntary Action, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
403, 404–05 (1998) (“Criminal lawyers have often said there must at least be proof of a ‘voluntary
act’ by the defendant if she is to be convicted of any offense. This reflects the insight that one is
liable to be praised or blamed for the occurrence of an outcome only when one is morally
responsible for that outcome—and that one cannot be morally responsible for bringing anything
about unless it is brought about voluntarily.”); Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011
UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1404 (2011) (“Under the standard view, the offender deserves punishment
only if he could have abstained from committing the crime.”). Not all scholars believe that the
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Holmes writes, “[t]he reason for requiring an act [as a precondition for the
existence of an offense] is, that [it] implies a choice, and that it is [considered
unfair] to make a [person] answerable for harm, unless he might have chosen
otherwise.” 62 In fact, regardless of one’s theory of punishment (utilitarian
prevention, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, etc.), that punishment
becomes unhinged from its purpose without a voluntary act. 63 There is nothing
to prevent, no conduct to be condemned and avoided, and no one to be
rehabilitated where the punished action is involuntary. The courts have imposed
an act requirement because of an implicit understanding that punishment loses
its punch without a voluntary act.
When viewed in light of its purpose, the voluntary act requirement begins to
acquire new boundaries not present in a strict construal of its language. We
might now ask not only, “does the conduct include a voluntary act?” but further,
“can that voluntary act fairly predicate the derivative punishment?” When we
ask both questions, as opposed to just the first, we get a more precise and just
implementation of the voluntary act requirement. I believe that courts in
introducing-prison-contraband cases have unconsciously been asking
themselves these questions, and then using time-framing and disjoined/unified
actions to reach their preferred result.

voluntary act requirement stands as a necessary predicate to culpability. Doug Husak argues that
“[i]f the act requirement should be construed to hold that only acts are and ought to be the objects
of liability, it unquestionably is false” because the State regularly punishes non-acts, like
possession. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2439
(2007).
62. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 54 (Little, Brown & Co. 1949)
(1881).
63. In his book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Herbert Packer compiles a list of common
theories of punishment in Chapter Three. Packer places every theory of punishment under the
umbrella of two ultimate purposes: (1) “[T]he . . . infliction of suffering on evildoers” and (2) “the
prevention of crime.” HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 36 (1968).
Julian Hermida notes that these different theories all rely in some way on a voluntary act to justify
their purpose:
Utilitarians would see little social benefit in punishing a person who does not carry out a
voluntary act. This argument is not based on an idea of intrinsic justice, but on the belief
that punishing an involuntary offender would not effectively deter the offender or other
members of society who many commit similar involuntary acts. Retributivism’s major tenet
is that the offender deserves punishment when he ‘freely chooses to violate society’s rules.’
An offender who does not act voluntarily—even if he produced social harm—does not
deserve to be punished.
Julian Hermida, Convergence of Civil Law and Common Law in the Criminal Theory Realm, 13 U.
MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 163, 197–98 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
And regarding incapacitation and rehabilitation, Packer notes, “A man who is shown to
have committed a homicide through an accident for which he was not at fault does not present a
case for social protection through measures of incapacitation or reform.” PACKER, supra, at 64.
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That the courts rely not only on a strict reading of the voluntary act
requirement, but on notions of guilt is evident in the language employed in these
cases. The cases that find no voluntary act focus on the defendant’s lack of
choice or autonomy. In State v. Cole, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated
that “a voluntary act requires something more than awareness. It requires an
ability to choose which course to take-i.e., an ability to choose whether to
commit the act that gives rise to criminal liability.” 64 And Tippetts emphasized
that “the involuntary act must, at a minimum, be a reasonably foreseeable or
likely consequence of the voluntary act on which the state seeks to base criminal
liability.” 65 These cases both involve conduct that “includes a voluntary act,”
but, because the courts were not convinced that the defendants’ actions merited
punishment, they used time-framing and disjoining to claim no voluntary act had
been committed.
Those cases that do find a voluntary act also include language assessing
whether the defendant’s voluntary conduct can fairly support punishment. Many
of these cases focus on the decision to retain the drugs once the arresting officer
warned the defendant that possessing drugs at the county jail will constitute a
felony. For instance, in State v. Alvarado, the court noted:
Finally, the circumstance here that both the arresting officer and the detention
officer informed defendant of the consequences of bringing contraband into the
jail and gave him an opportunity to surrender any contraband beforehand
highlight that defendant was performing a bodily movement “consciously and
as a result of effort and determination” when he carried the contraband into the
jail. 66

And in Herron v. Commonwealth, the court noted:
Further, after appellant was arrested, Thomas asked appellant if he had any drugs
on his person, to which appellant responded that he did not. Before entering the
jail, Thomas again asked appellant if he had any drugs on his person and advised
appellant that there were additional charges for bringing contraband into the jail.
However, appellant chose to conceal drugs on his person and then failed to
disclose the drugs after being advised of the consequences of bringing drugs into
the jail. Under these circumstances, we hold appellant’s act of taking drugs into
the jail was voluntary. 67

The courts rely upon the officers’ warnings because the warnings impart
knowledge of the crime onto defendants; and this knowledge is a threshold

64. 164 P.3d 1024, 1027 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Tippetts, 43 P.3d 455, 458
(Or. Ct. App. 2002)).
65. Tippetts, 43 P.3d at 459–60.
66. 200 P.3d 1037, 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
67. 688 S.E.2d 901, 906 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
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consideration of culpability, what some authors have called an “epistemic
precondition” of blameworthiness. 68
Interestingly though, despite their bearing on culpability, the officers’
warnings have little to no effect on the completion of a voluntary act. By the
rationale set out in Winsor, the only relevant inquiry is whether the defendant
voluntarily possessed the marijuana at the time of the arrest. Remember there
the court stated, “Appellant’s willful possession of a controlled substance itself
constitutes the requisite voluntary act.” 69 Admittedly in Winsor, the court did
refer to the officer’s warning in deciding that Winsor had voluntarily possessed
the marijuana, but that was not a necessary route. The court could have
determined that Winsor voluntarily possessed the marijuana “for a sufficient
time to have enabled him . . . to dispose of it” because the car ride to the county
jail was lengthy. Or, like it did in Herron, the court could find appellant had
ample opportunity to dispose of the drugs because “[t]he evidence at trial
showed that appellant was inside an apartment for ten to fifteen seconds before
Officer Thomas entered.” 70 These alternative methods of proving voluntary
possession highlight the possibility that a court could meet the single voluntary
act requirement without reference to the officers’ warnings, even though it is
precisely those warnings which ensure culpability.
Arguably, the officers’ warnings create a duty for the defendants to dispose
of their drugs and the failure to do so becomes an omission, which satisfies
liability to the same extent as a voluntary act. 71 “An omission is either (a) a
deliberate failure to perform a certain positive action or (b) a failure, whether
deliberate or not, to fulfill a moral or legal duty or reasonable expectation.” 72
Under this definition, retaining possession of a controlled substance after a

68. Scholar Ken Levy writes that there are four conditions for the blameworthiness of an
action: 1) knowledge, or a threshold capacity to know, that the action is morally wrong; 2) threshold
capacity to refrain from the action; 3) control over the action; and 4) an absence of circumstances
that excuse this performance. Ken Levy, Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible but Not
Morally Responsible, Subject to Criminal Punishment and to Preventive Detention, 48 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1299, 1328–29 (2011). Levy refers to the knowledge that an action is morally wrong as the
“epistemic precondition,” borrowing the term from Carla L. Harenski, Robert D. Hare & Kent A.
Kiehl, Neuroimaging, Genetics, and Psychopathy: Implications for the Legal System, in
RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHOPATHY: INTERFACING LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND PHILOSOPHY 125,
139–40 (Luca Malatesti & John McMillan eds., 2010).
69. State v. Winsor, 110 S.W.3d 882, 886 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
70. Herron, 688 S.E.2d at 906.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., 1962) (“A person is not guilty of an
offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act of which he is physically capable.” (emphasis added)).
72. Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44
GA. L. REV. 607, 632 (2010).
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warning could conceivably fit under either category. 73 However, the law
generally requires an omission be a failure to perform while under a legal duty
not a moral duty or reasonable expectation and certainly not the mere failure to
perform any positive action. For example:
[W]here a married man, during his wife’s temporary absence from home,
engaged in a drunken debauch with an adult woman of experience, he owed her
no legal duty of care and protection which would render him legally responsible
for her death from an overdose of morphine, taken with suicidal intent, though
he neglected to obtain medical assistance for her. On the other hand, where the
mother of a young child absented herself from the family home while the child
was locked in a bedroom and the child was killed in a fire of undetermined
origin, she was guilty of manslaughter because of her statutory duty not to permit
the child to become neglected. 74

Here, the duty incumbent on the defendants after they have been warned is not
a new legal duty. The legal duty to rid themselves of the controlled substance is
no more real or pressing after the warning than it was before the warning; with
or without the warning, the possessor of a controlled substance stands under duty
of possession laws to rid him or herself of that substance. Therefore, because no
further duty has been violated, it cannot fairly be claimed that the omission
predicating simple possession, can serve equally well as a predicate for
introducing prison contraband.
Yet, while there is no further legal duty, there certainly is an additional
moral duty or reasonable expectation which accompanies these officers’
warnings. Once an officer has warned a defendant that possessing drugs at the
jail will be a felony, his omission to relinquish those drugs has a heightened
intention. Importantly, intention does not have the same legal consequences as
voluntariness. The law frequently punishes unintentional acts, i.e., negligent
acts, as long as the conduct includes a voluntary act. 75 And the law does not

73. Levy defines a positive action as “any agent-caused event that does not essentially involve
a failure or not-doing in its description. Running, walking, talking, and hitting are paradigmatic
examples. They can all be described entirely in positive terms.” Id. at 633. Here, the positive action
would be discarding. The failure to discard contraband is a positive action under category (a) and,
under (b), a failure to fulfill a legal duty (possession laws), moral duty (controlled substances have
a stigma attached to possession), and a reasonable expectation.
74. 3A GLENN C. GILLESPIE, MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 91:36 (2d ed.
1989) (first citing People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128 (Mich. 1907); then citing Wayne Cty.
Prosecutor v. Recorder’s Court Judge, 324 N.W.2d 43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); then citing People v.
Ogg, 182 N.W.2d 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970)), Westlaw, Michigan Texts & Treatises (database
updated April 2017).
75. A classic example is a car accident. Few people who get into car accidents intend them,
and if they do they are likely to get charged with assault. Yet, we punish car accidents if there exists
the requisite voluntary act. Some scholars, like Jerome Hall, have argued against criminalizing
negligence because of a belief that culpability is necessarily tied to intention not voluntariness.
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punish pure intention without an act. 76 But intention does have culpability
consequences comparable to those of voluntariness. As one scholar puts it, “it is
never less blameworthy to bring about an evil outcome when the agent has the
intention of bringing it about than it is to bring it about when the agent does not
have the intention of bringing it about.” 77 Therefore, while the officers’
warnings may not qualify the defendants’ retention of drugs as a legal omission
satisfying the language of the voluntary act requirement, it does give an added
level of moral reprehensibility in as much as it creates a heightened intention.
The officers’ warnings do not help the court answer the question “does the
conduct include a voluntary act or omission?” Rather, the officers’ warnings
help the court determine the guilt question: “Can that voluntary act fairly
predicate the derivative punishment?” Therefore, whether the courts choose to
focus on the defendants’ autonomy or the officers’ warnings, in either case the
courts are relying on both the explicit rule language of its voluntary act statute
(“includes a voluntary act”) and on notions of culpability. Once we admit that
culpability is shaping the parameters for determining a voluntary act, we are
faced with the new challenge of deciding what effect should culpability play in
adjudicating introducing-prison-contraband cases.
IV. EFFECT ON INTRODUCING-PRISON-CONTRABAND CASES
I think the first and most obvious effect of admitting that we select our
voluntary acts, in part, on notions of culpability is that introducing-prisoncontraband cases will be decided on personal, or at best normative, grounds. 78
At first, this result might not seem too dire; all crimes are created by normative
grounds in as much as our legislature reflects the people’s moral stance. As
Henry Hart puts it, crime “is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place,
will incur a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of
the community.” 79 At some level then, the ultimate culpability of one
introducing prison contraband will always be tied to the community’s moral
Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
632, 639 (1963).
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note on subsection (1) (“Under the Code, liability
cannot be based upon mere thoughts . . . .”).
77. L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-Philosophical
Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 459, 493 (1998).
78. Robert Leikind, Regulating the Criminal Conduct of Morally Innocent Persons: The
Problem of the Indigenous Defendant, 6 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 161–62 (1986) (“Moral
culpability refers to a voluntary breach of known norms which guide the conduct of a community.
All members of a community live with the expectation that they have knowledge of the
community’s norms and standards. When members of a community breach established norms, their
actions are perceived to involve some quantum of moral turpitude, precisely because they were
expected to know their conduct was offensive.” (footnotes omitted)).
79. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958).
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stance. The issue only arises when the court’s notion of culpability is opposed
to that of the community.
Fortunately, the law does not have to conclusively answer the most difficult
questions, like, what exactly comprises voluntariness and what is the best
standard of culpability. The law need only meet these problems head-on with
statutes effectuating if not the best, at least a consistent, level of culpability.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draft accurate statutes for introducing-prisoncontraband cases because the added moral reprehensibility which distinguishes
simple drug possessors from drug smugglers lies primarily in their intention, and
not their actions. Take for example two criminals: Criminal A possesses two
grams of marijuana, which he hopes and intends to smuggle into a local
correctional facility by getting arrested. Criminal B possesses two grams of
marijuana and has no intention or hope of ever introducing it into a correctional
facility. In fact, just the opposite, criminal B would prefer to not have the
marijuana at a correctional facility, for fear of committing a more serious crime.
One would hope that when criminal A is arrested and searched at the county jail,
he is charged under the introducing-prison-contraband statute. However, when
criminal B, who has committed identical acts to criminal A, is arrested and
searched, one would hope that he receives a lighter sentence than criminal A.
How then are the statutes to distinguish the two criminals? Statutes can
criminalize intention in the form of mens rea requirements, but not without
creating significant evidentiary hurdles, as evidence of mens rea relies generally
on circumstantial evidence. 80 Additionally, the mens rea of “knowingly” used
in many introducing-prison-contraband cases is subsumed by the act of
possession. Possession, as one scholar points out, is not really an act, but more
of a status. 81 The MPC defines possession as (1) having “knowingly procured or
received the thing possessed” or (2) when one is “aware of his control thereof
for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.” 82 And “[a]n
act is ‘voluntary’ when the bodily movement is the product of conscious effort
or determination.” 83 Putting these two together, as Gideon Yaffe notes, (1)
knowingly procuring an object is a conscious bodily movement, but (2) simply
being aware of one’s control is not. 84 Because possession is frequently number
(2), and not an act, it is difficult to employ a mens rea requirement. Instead, what
usually ends up happening is courts read an unwritten requirement of knowledge
into the object of possession. That is, courts require that the defendant “know”
80. State v. Germain, 79 A.3d 1025, 1032 (N.H. 2013) (“We note that although most cases
will include direct evidence as to at least one element, proof of mens rea will usually depend
entirely upon circumstantial evidence.”).
81. Gideon Yaffe, In Defense of Criminal Possession, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 441, 442–43
(2016).
82. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (AM. LAW INST., 1962)
83. 1 Charles E. Torcia, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 25 (14th ed. 1978).
84. Yaffe, supra note 81, at 443.
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he or she currently possesses the object, not that he or she “knowingly” procured
it. 85 When the standard is mere knowledge of an items’ presence, both criminal
A and criminal B will always satisfy the mens rea requirement. The challenge
then is to create statutes which ferret out an intent to violate the statute, without
creating meaningless mens rea requirements.
I propose three changes that could be made to states’ introducing-prisoncontraband statutes which would accurately satisfy the culpability concerns
surrounding intent and a single voluntary act requirement, without the collateral
effect of criminalizing those who are guilty of mere possession.
The first change is to include language which mandates a warning from the
arresting officer before a defendant can be found guilty of introducing prison
contraband. The language could look like this 86:
X. It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform any person arrested and
taken to a correctional facility that:
(i) He or she will be searched upon admission to the correctional facility;
(ii) Knowingly delivering, attempting to deliver, having in his or her possession,
depositing, or concealing in or about the premises of any county or private jail
or other county correctional facility any item listed in subdivision (1)-(4) of
subsection 1 may constitute a felony;
(iii) Announcing possession of any item listed in subdivision (1)-(4) of
subsection 1 will not prevent further prosecution.

A mandatory warning helps separate criminal A from criminal B, not by
requiring any further voluntary acts or imposing a new mens rea, but by
revealing intention and therefore culpability. Both criminals, after the warning,
have the choice between admission or retention of their drugs. Regardless of
what the criminals choose or why, if either criminal is later found to have drugs
at the facility, he or she cannot argue that the possession is unintentional because
he or she knew the impending consequences.
In most instances the officer provides a warning of his or her own accord,
despite there being no requirement. 87 But so long as the officer need not warn
defendants of a potential introducing-prison-contraband charge, the door is open

85. See, e.g., State v. Ndikum, 815 N.W.2d 816, 817 (Minn. 2012) (holding that where the
court was to assume an unwritten mens rea of “knowingly” in the context of possession of a gun in
public, that mens rea required that defendant know a gun was present in his suitcase, not that he at
some point knowingly procured or received the gun).
86. I modify the statutory language of Missouri Revised Statutes section 221.111 (2017)
because that is the state in which I write. However, this language could be incorporated into any
statutory scheme.
87. Of the thirteen cases cited supra notes 11 and 12, ten include a reference to an officer
warning defendant that his or her possession of contraband at the county jail could constitute a
felony. However, the prevalence of these warnings is attributable to good policing not to good
policy. No state’s statute requires this warning.
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for courts to satisfy only the letter of the voluntary act requirement, i.e., that it
“includes a voluntary act,” and not its purpose of ensuring culpability.
The court does exactly this in State v. Barnes, when it held that “the
voluntary act necessary for guilt of the offense made punishable by General
Statutes of North Carolina section 90–95(e)(9) occurs when the defendant
knowingly possesses a controlled substance,” regardless of whether the officer
warned the defendant that his retention of contraband could constitute a further
felony. 88 Because voluntary possession alone does not fairly predicate the
increased punishment from mere possession (here, a class three misdemeanor)
to introducing prison contraband (here, a class H felony), the culpability
concerns of the voluntary act requirement are not satisfied. 89 But, as the court
points out, the single voluntary act requirement certainly is satisfied. 90 In effect,
by admitting only the possession was voluntary, North Carolina is imposing an
increased punishment for the performance of an involuntary act. That is a
problem. A statutory mandate fixes this problem by making the previously
optional and arbitrary culpability determination both explicit and certain.
Moreover, a warning like this would not be unique to criminal codes. Most
States require that an officer give fair warning to a motorist that refusal to submit
to field or chemical sobriety tests may result in penalties. 91 In Pennsylvania for
instance, the statute states, in pertinent part:
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that:
(i) the person’s operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit to
chemical testing . . . ; and
(ii) if the person refuses to submit to chemical testing, upon conviction or plea
for violating section 3802(a)(1), the person will be subject to the penalties
provided in section 3804(c) (relating to penalties). 92

And, of course, Miranda v. Arizona requires that before questioning a
defendant in custody, police officers must inform him (1) that he has the right to
remain silent; (2) that his statements may be used against him at trial; (3) that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and (4) that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. 93
Warnings like those required by Miranda and States administering on-thescene Blood Alcohol Tests exist to assure the courts that the subsequent action

88.
89.
90.
91.

747 S.E.2d 912, 920 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 924.
Id. at 920.
DONALD H. NICHOLS & FLEM K. WHITED III, 1 DRINKING/DRIVING LITIGATION:
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL § 11:15 (2d ed. 2016).
92. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547 (2016).
93. 384 U.S. 436, 471, 473 (1966).
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is voluntary. 94 Admittedly, when the Court in Miranda speaks of voluntariness
it is not referring to the conscious bodily movements required by voluntary act
statutes. 95 Nevertheless, the admissibility of a confession depends on its
voluntariness because only voluntary confessions have the evidentiary power to
ground punishment. 96 Therefore, although Miranda’s warnings, and those like
it, do not ensure voluntary acts in the physical sense, they nonetheless ensure
voluntary acts in a culpability sense, in as much as they ensure the punishment
can be fairly administered.
Also, a mandatory warning for arrestees would not affect those already
confined in correctional facilities. Another difficulty in drafting introducingprison-contraband statutes is ensuring that those already within correctional
facilities fall within the meaning of the statute, but not those who, although
technically on the premises of a correctional facility, are not yet fully admitted.
The proposed warning applies only to “any person arrested and taken to a
correctional facility,” not to any person on the premises of a correctional facility.
Therefore, the protections afforded by the statutory warning are narrowly
tailored to affect only arrestees being taken to facilities.
The second suggestion is to require the arrestee to sign a disclaimer upon
entry of the county jail. This disclaimer would inform the arrestee that if he or
she possesses any contraband he must declare so immediately or face potentially
higher charges. The county jail in State v. Cole, implemented such a warning
and its language in relevant part was as follows:
You’ve indicated that you have no weapons, drugs, [or] anything that will hurt
me during this search, etc. [sic] on your person or in your possession (Other than
what you’ve told me). If you tell me now about any such items, if illegal, you
may be charged with their possession. If you do not tell me now and I find them

94. The dissent in Miranda refers to the mandatory warning as attempting to require
“voluntariness with a vengeance.” Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Congress later attempted to
limit Miranda’s high burden for voluntariness. Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 210 (1968) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012)). The opening line of § 3501 reads “[i]n any criminal
prosecution . . . a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.” But in
United States v. Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the need for Miranda’s warning to ensure
that confessions are voluntary. 530 U.S. 428, 431–32 (2000).
95. In fact, the Miranda Court is referring to almost the opposite. It says, “Again we stress
that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically
oriented.” 384 U.S. at 448. The Court wished to ensure that confessions are psychologically
voluntary, not physically voluntary, which is the concern of voluntary act statutes.
96. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896) (“While the admissions or confessions of
the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a
crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial
character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant,
to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions . . . made the system so odious
as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.”).
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during this search, you will not only be charged with their possession, but [you]
will also be charged with Introducing Contraband into a Detention Facility[.] 97

Again, such a warning has no effect on whether the conduct includes a voluntary
act. In fact, in State v. Cole, the defendant was not found to have voluntarily
introduced prison contraband, despite signing such a disclaimer, because “the
undisputed facts show[ed] that Defendant did not bring contraband into the
[county jail]; law enforcement brought him and the contraband in his possession
into the facility.” 98 But, even though the disclaimer does not affect the
commission of a voluntary act, it does guarantee that the defendant is culpable,
which is the underlying purpose of the voluntary act requirement, and the
element most frequently lacking in these cases.
It must be noted that in order for disclaimers such as the one used in Cole to
work, the case law must change. As it stands, a person is guilty of introducing
prison contraband as soon as he or she steps foot in the door of the correctional
facility, or possibly, as soon as he or she steps foot in the parking lot. 99 So, while
the disclaimer promises the arrestee that declaring the contraband will insulate
him or her from the heightened charge of introducing prison contraband, this is
not entirely true. The defendant has already committed the crime of introducing
prison contraband by being in the correctional facility. The disclaimer is only an
agreement to not press the admittedly committed charge of introducing prison
contraband.
Whether such disclaimers are binding on prosecutors is up for debate. The
State’s Department of Corrections would write the disclaimer. And, police
officers conducting the arrest and search would be issuing the promises within
the disclaimer. Although some State and circuit courts are willing to offer relief
for agreements made between government officials and arrestees on estoppel

97. 164 P.3d 1024, 1025 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
98. Id. at 1027.
99. There are no cases in which the defendant is charged with introducing prison contraband
for his or her presence in the parking lot, but in such an instance the defendant would be just as
guilty of being on the premises of a correctional facility as he or she would be inside. In most
introducing-prison-contraband cases, the searches take place inside the facility but before the
defendant is admitted to his or her cell. For instance, in State v. Cargile, the defendant was found
to have marijuana in the cuff of his pants before he is placed in a holding cell. 916 N.E.2d 775, 776
(Ohio 2009). The court’s language in State v. Eaton is instructive: “As [the State] rightfully points
out, he’s inside the jail. Whether he’s been admitted inside the jail or is walking through the jail,
he’s inside the secure facility. He’s under arrest. And he has possession. And if you read the statute,
it says, mere possession inside the facility gives rise to the enhancement.” 177 P.3d 157, 158–59
(Wash. Ct. App. 2008). Or for a comparable case outside the contraband context, see United States
v. Coleman, where the defendant kicked an officer in the shin while being carried through a
revolving door to a post office. 475 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Penn. 1972). Even though defendant
was involuntarily carried from a public place into the threshold of a federal building (i.e., the post
office) he was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 113(d) (2012), which prohibits “striking, beating, or
wounding” another “within the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 423.
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grounds supported by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 100 the general rule
is that only prosecutors may conduct binding plea agreements. 101
A non-binding agreement to not prosecute a crime that has already been
committed is not effective. To give the disclaimer any practical protection for
an arrestee the case law would need to change to an understanding that the
arrestee is not guilty of introducing prison contraband until after formal search
and admittance. Only then would the statement of the disclaimer, “[i]f you do
not tell me now and I find [contraband] during this search, you will not only be
charged with their possession, but [you] will also be charged with Introducing
Contraband into a Detention Facility” be true. As it currently stands, regardless
of whether the arrestee admits possession of contraband, he or she can be
charged with introducing prison contraband.
The third and final suggestion is to statutorily distinguish between
introducing prison contraband and possessing prison contraband. Missouri,
Kentucky, and Arizona, among other states, currently contain a single
introducing-prison-contraband statute which punishes both introducing prison
contraband and possessing prison contraband. 102 If these States were to separate
introducing contraband from possessing contraband, they could apply useful
distinctions in mens rea and location to target specific types of offenders.
Missouri’s introducing-prison-contraband statute, section 221.111, states:
1. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or
jail if such person knowingly delivers, attempts to deliver, possesses, deposits,
or conceals in or about the premises of any correctional center as the term
“correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any city, county, or
private jail.

Consider the following modification to the statute:
X. A person commits the offense of introducing unlawful items into a prison or
jail if such person knowingly delivers or attempts to deliver into the premises of
any correctional center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section
217.010, or any city, county, or private jail.
Y. A person commits the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or
jail if such person knowingly possesses or conceals within the premises of any
correctional center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section
217.010, or any city, county, or private jail.

100. United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rodman, 519
F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 427–28 (4th Cir. 1972);
People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922, 931 (Colo. 1983).
101. Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295 (Pa. 1995) (“Affording police officers
authority to enter agreements that [bind the State] . . . . would create havoc in the administration of
justice . . . .”).
102. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2505 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 520.050 (2017); MO.
REV. STAT. § 221.111 (2017).
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Z. For the purposes of subsection Y, no person being searched as part of an initial
admittance process shall be found to be within the premises of any correctional
center as the term “correctional center” is defined under section 217.010, or any
city, county, or private jail.

Under this proposed statute, criminals like A and B could be separated on purely
statutory grounds. For instance, if a person is arrested and taken to the county
jail, due to subsection Z, he or she is no longer automatically in violation of
section 221.111, by reason of his or her mere possession. However, the person
could still be in violation of subsection X. Importantly, though, violation of
subsection X requires a showing that he or she knowingly delivered or attempted
to deliver the contraband into the premises. The added requirement of proving
delivery or attempted delivery effectively safeguards those like criminal B, who
involuntarily brought contraband to the correctional facility, because mere
possession of contraband at the initial search stage will not be sufficient evidence
of delivery. Yet, because delivery is still punished, those like criminal A, who
voluntarily brought contraband with the intention to smuggle the items inside
can still be found guilty. Admittedly, there are new evidentiary hurdles posed by
requiring a showing of delivery, but these hurdles are small and surmountable if
the arrestee is truly guilty. Evidence of delivery could include an intended or
probable recipient, a suspicious quantity of contraband, or a contraband item
uniquely useful to the prison context. 103 These evidentiary hurdles will
undoubtedly create some instances where the guilty criminal walks free, but they
will also ensure freedom for many more innocent arrestees.
Additionally, separating the acts of delivery and possession by statute helps
prevent courts from using disjoining/unifying behavior to selectively find
voluntary acts. A court will no longer be able to claim possession at a
correctional facility is a contributing action of delivery into a correctional
facility when the possession is itself a punishable action.
As a passing note, there is one more significant reason to rework our
introducing-prison-contraband statutes: cellphones. The use of cellphones in
prisons has become widespread and dangerous enough to warrant federal
attention. 104 In response, many States have begun addressing cellphone use in

103. Take for example the case of State v. Boykins, where the defendant tried to ship thirty
cellphones, tobacco, and codeine to his brother. There, the recipient (the brother), the quantity of
one of the items (fifty cellphones), and the quality of the items (three items forbidden in prison) all
point toward intent to deliver and not personal use accidentally present at a correctional facility.
No. W2012–01012–CCA–R3–CD, 2013 WL 1229393, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2013).
104. Contraband Cell Phones in Correctional Facilities: Public Safety Impact and the
Potential Implications of Jamming Technologies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg564
06/html/CHRG-111shrg56406.htm [https://perma.cc/Y3W7-VDCM]; Erin Fitzgerald, Comment,
“Cell Block” Silence: Why Contraband Cellular Telephone Use in Prisons Warrants Federal
Legislation to Allow Jamming Technology, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1269, 1269 (2010).
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prisons by adding cellphones to their lists of contraband. 105 The addition of
cellphones to contraband lists poses a major problem considering so many State
courts’ interpretation of their introducing-prison-contraband statutes. While
perhaps few arrestees possess marijuana or a weapon at the time of their arrest,
nearly everyone will possess a cellphone. 106 Under the interpretation espoused
in cases like Winsor and Barnes, any person present on or about the premises of
a correctional facility, who voluntarily possesses his or her cellphone, will be in
violation of an introducing-prison-contraband statute. Arizona has already
charged someone in such a circumstance under its introducing-prisoncontraband statute. 107 In State v. Francis, an arrestee used his cellphone to call
his attorney. The defendant remained in possession of his cellphone when law
enforcement transported him to jail. 108 The defendant was acquitted on the
grounds that he was not aware his cellphone was contraband, 109 but States
lacking statutes with similar knowledge requirements will have to confront the
problems posed in the Francis situation. 110
These three proposed changes, (1) mandatory officer warnings, (2)
mandatory written disclaimers, and (3) a reworking of our introducing-prisoncontraband statutes, each ensure an objective level of culpability where the
single voluntary act requirement does not. By employing one of these three
methods, a State’s legislature can make certain that any person arrested and
taken to jail with contraband will only be held liable if he or she meets an explicit

105. For legislative responses see, for example, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-14 (2013) (“C. As
used in this section, ‘contraband’ means: . . . (5) an electronic communication or recording device
brought onto the grounds of the institution for the purpose of transfer to or use by a prisoner.”);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 21 (2015) (“E. Any person who knowingly, willfully and without
authority brings into or has in his or her possession in any secure area of a jail or state penal
institution or other secure place where prisoners are located any cellular phone or electronic device
capable of sending or receiving any electronic communication shall, upon conviction, be guilty of
a felony . . . .”). For judicial responses see, for example, People v. Green, 927 N.Y. S.2d 296 (Sup.
Ct. 2011) (holding that cell phones are dangerous contraband within the meaning of the prison
contraband statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.00(4)); Mays v. State, 76 A.3d 778 (Del. 2013) (noting
a cellphone was within prison contraband statute, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1256 (2008)).
106. Pew studies showed that roughly ninety-two percent of Americans use a cellphone.
Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/ [https://perma.cc/2E
J5-S6RU].
107. State v. Francis, 388 P.3d 843, 844 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 848.
110. Missouri may soon become such a state. Missouri’s House of Representatives member
Paul Fitzwater has proposed HB 207 which adds cellphones to Missouri’s list of contraband.
However, because Missouri’s statutes are written such that the defendant need only knowingly
possess the cellphone and not additionally know the cellphone is contraband, any person who finds
him or herself in Francis’s situation will be in violation of Missouri Revised Statutes section
221.111 (2017).
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level of culpability. Otherwise, judges will continue to employ the arbitrary
selection of voluntary acts with the help of time-framing and disjoining/unifying
acts in order to reach results they find satisfy personal notions of guilt.
CONCLUSION
The voluntary act requirement should do what it was meant to do: ensure
culpability. Under a single voluntary act view it does not. Nowhere is this more
evident than in our introducing-prison-contraband cases. Right now, the
majority of States find a woman, arrested, placed in the back of a police car, and
driven to a correctional facility with drugs in her pocket, to be guilty of
introducing prison contraband. This woman could have no desire to commit the
crime, or, if the drugs were a cell phone, she might not even know the crime was
being committed. Nevertheless, courts have time and again found these
defendants liable.
In response to the seemingly limitless boundary of the single voluntary act
requirement, I propose the explicit addition of culpability. And in response to
the hopelessly subjective nature of culpability I propose three statutory solutions
which will assure culpability where the voluntary act requirement does not.
These three solutions, a statutory warning, a signed disclaimer, and a clarifying
of the statute, ensure that the introducing-prison-contraband statutes punish only
those who either intend to bring contraband into a correctional facility or at least
were well aware that retaining the contraband would incur higher charges.
To end, I return to the question that opened this Paper: When has one
committed the crime of introducing prison contraband? In a certain sense, the
answer is as soon as one possesses contraband. For it is that action, possession,
on which the court bases liability. This paper has argued that answer is unjust:
unjust because possession does not foreseeably result in introducing prison
contraband; unjust because the crime was not intentional; and unjust because,
despite passing the letter of our voluntary act statutes, the act does not reflect
culpability.
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